Review of \u3ci\u3eThe Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation\u3c/i\u3e, by Alan Paskow by Dostal, Robert J.
Bryn Mawr College
Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
Philosophy Faculty Research and Scholarship Philosophy
2007
Review of The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological
Investigation, by Alan Paskow
Robert J. Dostal
Bryn Mawr College, rdostal@brynmawr.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/philosophy_pubs/3
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.
Custom Citation
Dostal, Robert J. Review of The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation, by Alan Paskow. Continental Philosophy Review 40,
no. 4 (2007): 455-458.
 1 
Robert J. Dostal 
Bryn Mawr College 
 
The Paradoxes of Art: A Phenomenological Investigation 
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ISBN 0 521 82833 3 
 
Though the title suggests a phenomenological account of art and, in fact, has some 
important and insightful things to say about art, this work focuses primarily on the 
ontological status of “fictional beings” and the question of “representation” in art and in 
experience more generally.  Paskow makes a case for a “realist” aesthetic.  The first part 
of the book, which provides examples from literature and painting, culminates in a 
discussion of why fictional beings can be important to us.  The second part of the book is 
almost exclusively devoted to a consideration of painting.  It illustrates how a realist 
aesthetic can be brought to bear on painting and develops this aesthetic in relation to this 
particular art form.  Throughout Paskow is concerned not only with what we should take 
art to be, but why it should matter to us. 
 
 This work is genuinely “phenomenological” in the sense that it attends directly to 
our experience of the work of art, especially the painting.  Unlike much American current 
literature in continental philosophy, it is not primarily a commentary on the texts of 
continental philosophers who have addressed the topic at hand.  In fact, for good or ill, 
Paskow ignores the 20th century phenomenological literature on art and painting—Geiger, 
Heidegger, Ingarden, Dufrenne, Merleau-Ponty among others.  The body of literature that 
he does explicitly take up (Chapter I) is contemporary analytic aesthetics:  especially 
Walton and Yanal, but also Carroll, Boruah, Rosebury among others.  However varied, 
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complex, and insightful the work of these philosophers is, Paskow takes them all to be 
committed to some sort of representationalism.  On his account, they are all committed to 
an orientation characterized by a subject-object split and thus end up quarreling over 
subjectivistic and objectivistic accounts of art.  Paskow’s realism is not an objectivism. 
 
 He finds his orientation in the Heidegger of Being and Time, the Heidegger of 
phenomenological ontology.  Chapters II and III draw on Being and Time for an account 
of how we might have a non-instrumental relation to things and “why and how others 
matter” to us.  Paskow argues that Heidegger’s great contribution in Being and Time is to 
show us the way out of the false alternative between egocentricity (and 
anthropomorphism) and theocentrism (God’s eye point of view, objectivism).  This false 
alternative derives from Cartesian representationalism.  He recognizes that Heidegger’s 
later developments have to do, at least in part, with Heidegger’s concern for a residue of 
egocentrism and anthropomorphism in his early work.  In addition, the early Heidegger 
has little to say about art and painting.  Most Heideggerians concerned with Paskow’s 
questions turn to Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art.  Paskow thinks that the later 
Heidegger “has not articulated a full or convincing theory of art.”(31)  Paskow does not 
find “sufficient clarity in the terms ‘earth,’ ‘world,’ ‘truth,’…and so forth….” (30). 
 
 In the introduction Paskow discusses briefly Husserl’s contribution toward a 
phenomenology of painting, most of which can be found in Husserliana XXIII: Phantasie, 
Bildbewusstsein, Errinerung.  Paskow asserts that Husserl failed to answer the question 
that he is posing, though Husserl’s accounts “are suggestive and, indirectly and 
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unintentionally, indicate the kind of epistemological position that I defend.”(21)  Further, 
Husserl “lacked the courage of his intuitions.”(24) Paskow also claims that Husserl never 
developed an account of human experience as “being-in-the-world.”  This reviewer 
would argue that Husserl’s account approximates Paskow’s position quite intentionally, 
that Husserl provides a critique of representationalism, and that Heidegger adopts and 
adapts this from Husserl.  Be that as it may, phenomenology for Paskow provides the 
way to a realist aesthetic.   
 
Yet it is a peculiar realism, for with regard to the things of experience, including 
art objects and paintings, Paskow also calls his approach Neo-Kantian and refers to his 
own “Neo-Kantian addendum” (114) to Heidegger’s account.  He argues that Heidegger 
in Being and Time “seems to be unconsciously admitting his belief in the existence of a 
phenomenologically inaccessible realm of things in themselves.”(113-4)  Paskow may be 
right about some of the formulations of Being and Time, but this is the very reason that 
Heidegger abandons the unfinished work.  Clearly and explicitly Heidegger wished to 
abandon the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he, following Husserl, saw as a function of 
the Cartesian tradition of representationalism. Paskow’s position thus remains captive to 
the representationalism that he claims to overcome.  He cannot find a way to reconcile 
the historical and cultural context of our experience of things with what he sees to be 
“naïve” common-sensical realism.  But he does not wish to give up any claim on the 
thing in itself, so he suggests, but does not develop, the notion that our experience of 
things is analogous to the thing in itself.  Accordingly, he suggests further that the things 
of our experience are symbols “at one level.”  
 4 
 
As one might expect from this kind of existential Neo-Kantian realism, Paskow is 
more interested in other persons than in the thinginess of things.  In a kind of summary, 
he states that his “contention is that paintings are at base about others—on the face of it, 
fictional others, but in an important and overlooked sense, “real” others—their stories, 
their concerns are, whether we acknowledge them or not, our stories, our concerns.”(150)  
Things, he goes on to say, “are always proxies for people.”(150)  Even abstract art tells 
the stories of others.  For his account of the experience of others, Paskow takes his cue 
from Being and Time and its presentation of two modes of relation with the other:  
leaping ahead and leaping in.  Paskow argues that these two alternatives are not adequate 
to our experience and suggests a third mode:  allowing the other entry into my life. This 
mode is the appropriate mode for coming to art and paintings in particular.  We can and 
should allow the fictional other into our lives. 
 
After dealing with the experience of things (Chapter II) and others (Chapter III), 
in Chapter IV (“Why and How Painting Matters”) Paskow turns to the experience of 
painting.  He suggests that the experience has three levels: 1) the unreflective visual and 
affective experience, 2) the spectator’s reflective effort to ascertain what the work is 
about, and 3) an evaluative and contextualizing conceptual placement of the work 
according to a particular purpose.  He calls this last level, the level of theory and 
interpretation.  He argues that philosophers have too much focused on this third level at 
the cost of the first two levels and the direct experience of the painting in which we allow 
it entry into our lives.  The third level is inevitably “distancing.”(151)  Using the example 
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of Vermeer’s The Woman Holding a Balance, Paskow attempts to provide a 
phenomenological account of the pre-theoretical experience of this painting.  Paskow has 
much to say about the experience of painting and about this painting by Vermeer in 
particular.  He suggests that we enter into the world (or better, “subworld”) of the 
painting “as though it were a dream of our own.”(181)  There is only one world but there 
are many subworlds.  In this way, Paskow can account for the differences and 
disagreements about paintings but also the value of entering into the conversation about 
the painting and engaging these differences and disagreements.  He appeals to the 
Gadamerian concept of the fusion of horizons to make sense of this experience.   
 
In the fifth and final chapter (“For and Against Interpretation”) Paskow discusses 
what he takes to be the seven basic schools of interpretation today:  1) traditional 
(formalism or new criticism), 2) psychological, 3) psychosocial, 4) sociohistorical, 5) 
subjectivist, 6) ethical, and 7) deconstructionist. A peculiarity of Paskow’s terminology is 
his distinction of his own phenomenological approach from “interpretive” approaches.  It 
is peculiar inasmuch as Heidegger is justifiably considered a major influence on the 
interpretive turn of much of recent “theory.”  The Heidegger of Being and Time calls his 
own phenomenology hermeneutical.  The work in hermeneutics by Gadamer and Ricoeur 
is scarcely mentioned by Paskow (only in the last few pages), though he acknowledges in 
a footnote (244) that his own position is best supplemented by “reception” theory.  The 
developers of reception theory, Jauss and Iser (neither of whom for whatever reason are 
listed in the bibliography) were much influenced by Gadamer.  As noted above, Paskow 
is “against” interpretation insofar as it distracts from the immediate experience of the 
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artwork.  Interpretive theory may be dogmatic and reductive.  Yet Paskow is not simply 
against theory.  This higher level of reflection may indeed provide important insight into 
the artwork, but any theoretical approach oversteps its bounds if it claims to be the only 
and final truth or if it does not pay sufficient attention to the work itself..  Paskow claims 
that the various theoretical approaches may be complementary to one another and that the 
theoretical approach to the artwork should be kept in a dialectical tension with the direct 
experience of the artwork.  At one point he suggests an “amalgamation of both 
phenomenological and interpretive responses.”(237) To illuminate this tension, Paskow 
chooses three of the theories (all “unmasking”) and provides three interpretations of the 
Vermeer painting to contrast with his own interpretation in the previous chapter:  feminist, 
Marxist, and deconstructionist.  His first two interpretations are quite credible and 
persuasive, unlike the deconstructionist interpretation, though of these Paskow is clearly 
most interested in the deconstructionist.  His commentary on Derrida and 
deconsstructionism is stronger, though unfortunately most of it is to be found in the 
footnotes.   
The book concludes with a summary of his position which he characterizes as 
conceding the relativity of alternative interpretations without endorsing relativism.  There 
is always an element of undecidability, ambiguity, and uncertainty in the understanding 
and interpretation of an artwork.  There is no definitive interpretation, though some are 
better than others.  These claims about interpretation are not at all unusual, 
nothwithstanding Paskow’s claims in the introduction and throughout the work for the 
unusual and bold character of position.  What philosophically is most interesting is how 
and why these claims about interpretation are made—how and why one can came 
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relativity without relativism.  To show the basis for his view Paskow refers both to his 
own Neo-Kantianism and a regulative ideal of the best interpretation and to Aristotle and 
Aquinas.  Aristotle he says provides “a theoretical underpinning” (238) to his claims 
about cross-cultural and trans-historical interpretation.  Paskow also refers to his own 
“quasi-universalistic position.”(239)  Put in historical terms, can one have one’s Aristotle 
and Kant too?  One might argue, as Paskow does implicitly, that this appeal to Aristotle 
and Kant characterizes Being and Time, the text that provides the lead for Paskow’s own 
interpretive approach.  But Paskow’s The Paradoxes of Art leaves the reader wishing for 
a more extensive account of a phenomenology that is both Aristotelian and Kantian. 
 
  
